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1. Introduction
The main thesis of contemporary legal positivism is the so-called social source thesis 
(SST). In Scott Shapiro’s formulation, it states that “legal facts are ultimately determi-
ned by social facts alone”4. The SST refers to the relation of determination between 
legal facts and social facts. And whereas the relata of such relations – legal facts and 
social facts – have been widely discussed5, the former mainly by legal philosophers, the 
latter by social ontologists, as well as legal philosophers in the legal context, the nature 
of the determination itself remains unclear. Of course, many philosophers of law have 
attempted to answer how social facts determine the content of law (i.e. legal facts), 
the most prominent of them being Herbert L.A. Hart and Scott Shapiro6. However, it 
still remains unclear what the nature of this relation is. It may be a semantic or logical 
relation, like entailment. It is, however, much more plausible that the proper locus of 
this determination is in the metaphysical sphere. Shapiro talks of legal and social facts, 
and facts surely belong to the metaphysical sphere. And the philosophy of law in general 
tries to find what law is, which is by far a metaphysical inquiry.
The determination of legal facts by social facts involves some sort of ontological 
dependence of legal facts on social facts, which means that legal facts are so-and-so 
due to social facts. But what sort of ontological dependence exactly is it? It is a question 
that rarely has been asked directly7. Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki who first directly asked 
1 ORCID number: 0000-0002-9207-524X. E-mail: szymon.mazurkiewicz@uj.edu.pl
2 The paper was written as a result of realization of the research project number 2017/27/N/HS5/00856 financed by 
National Science Centre, Poland.
3 I would like to thank Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki, Adam Dyrda, and Krzysztof Posłajko for critical comments and 
useful discussions.
4 S. Shapiro, Legality, Cambridge (Mass.) 2011, p. 269.
5 S. Shapiro, Legality…; J. Coleman. Rules and Social Facts, “Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy” 1991/3, 
pp. 703–725.
6 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford 2012.
7 To my best knowledge, David Plunkett (D. Plunkett, A Positivist Route for Explaining How Facts Make Law, “Legal 
Theory” 2012/2, pp. 139–207), was the first to claim that this relation of determination is something like metaphysical 
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the question what is the nature of the relation of determination from the perspective of 
analytic metaphysics, proposes three possible answers: reduction, supervenience, and 
metaphysical grounding8. He rejects reduction because it is impossible to reduce nor-
mative legal facts to descriptive social facts. He argues that the supervenience account 
does not deliver sufficient answers since supervenience is just a relation of covariance 
with no explanatory force. Gizbert-Studnicki opts for the grounding account: legal facts 
are metaphysically grounded in social facts.
In this paper, I would like to examine the grounding account of the determina-
tion of the relation between social facts and legal facts, as well as try to resolve some 
problems that this account involves. The first one is its unintelligibility: if one claims 
that legal facts are metaphysically grounded in social facts without explaining why this 
relation holds, such a claim does not seem to be explanatory sufficient. The second one 
is insufficient explanation of how normative legal facts can be grounded in descriptive 
social facts.
In the first part of this paper, I will sketch what legal positivists mean by the SST 
with reference to both exclusive and inclusive legal positivism. Secondly, I will present 
the notion of metaphysical grounding, which is a metaphysical explanatory relation 
involving ontological priority and strong ontological dependence. Then, I will present 
the debate between proponents of grounding on the question of the explanation of why 
grounding holds, wherein the first answer is that it is a primitive notion, the second re-
fers to essences of facts, and the third refers to metaphysical laws. Thirdly, I will examine 
the current application of metaphysical grounding in the SST that assumes a primitive 
notion of grounding and present it drawbacks. Next, I will propose a new formulation 
of the claim that legal facts are metaphysically grounded in social facts, which will be 
based on the view that grounding relations are backed by metaphysical laws. I will argue 
that instrumental rationality is metaphysical law backing a grounding relation between 
social and legal facts. Lastly, I will provide an assessment of that proposition, claiming 
that the notion of SST based on grounding that holds due to instrumental rationality 
as a metaphysical law backing this grounding relation between legal and social facts is 
intelligible, capable of explaining normative character of legal facts, and, mostly, close 
to a general form of explanation, including explanation in natural sciences.
2. Social source thesis
Legal positivism is defined by the SST. Shapiro’s proposition is short but very infor-
mative and holds that “Legal facts are ultimately determined by social facts alone”9.
grounding when he argued against Mark Greenberg’s (M. Greenberg, How Facts Make Law, “Legal Theory” 2004/3, 
pp. 157–198) view that moral facts are necessary in understanding the practice of law and, in particular the legal 
relevance of some social facts. However, Plunkett did not take advantage of metaphysical grounding; rather, he 
simply found that what himself and Greenberg were discussing in legal theory is very similar to the general analytic 
metaphysics debate on metaphysical grounding. Outside legal positivism and direct reference to SST, Bartosz Brożek 
in his naturalised project proposes that law supervenes on social regularities and mental states (B. Brożek, Normaty-
wność Prawa [Eng. The Normativity of Law], Warszawa 2012) and Wojciech Załuski claims that law is an emergent 
entity supervening on evolutionary meant human tendency to cooperate (W. Załuski, Evolutionary Theory and Legal 
Philosophy, Cheltenham 2009). 
8 T. Gizbert-Studnicki, Metafizyka pozytywizmu prawniczego [Eng. Metaphysics of legal positivism], “Principia” 2015/61–62, 
pp. 19–40; T. Gizbert-Studnicki, The Social Sources Thesis, Metaphysics and Metaphilosophy, in: P. Banas, A. Dyrda, 
T. Gizbert-Studnicki, (eds.), Metaphilosophy of Law, Oxford–Portland 2016, pp. 121–146.
9 S. Shapiro, Legality…, p. 269.
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For Shapiro, his formulation is able to include both inclusive and exclusive legal 
positivism. For an inclusivist, moral facts may sometimes determine legal facts; it is, 
however, a contingent feature of a particular legal system in which the rule of recogni-
tion refers to moral facts10. And since the rule of recognition, which determines which 
rules are legal rules, is based solely on social facts, the ultimate determination of legal 
facts still lies in social facts alone. On the other hand, non-positivists reject this thesis 
and claim that moral facts also necessarily participate in the determination of legal facts.
By legal facts, I simply mean facts about the content of a legal system, e.g. it is a legal 
fact of the Polish law that one is allowed to buy alcohol when she is at least 18. Every 
legal norm can be easily transformed into a legal fact. The legal norm of the Polish legal 
system that “one is allowed to buy alcohol when one is at least 18” can be transformed 
into the legal fact of the Polish legal system that one is allowed to buy alcohol when she 
is at least 18. Social facts are facts about people’s attitudes, behaviours, thoughts, etc. It 
is a social fact the drivers usually stop when the traffic light turns red, and it is a social 
fact that people generally think that wrong acts should be punished. In turn, moral facts 
are facts about the moral properties certain objects possess and the relations in which 
moral properties stand11. One may claim that it is a moral fact that slavery is wrong. 
Moral facts are normative facts; social facts are descriptive facts. I believe that legal facts 
are normative as well. Two kinds of normativity can be distinguished: weak and strong12. 
If a fact is normative in the weak sense, it is just related to a norm. If a fact is normative 
in the strong sense, it encompasses reasons for action. Since legal facts are able to guide 
one’s conduct and can be used in the assessment of someone’s behaviour, I believe they 
have reason-giving force; therefore, they are normative in the strong sense.
3. Metaphysical grounding
Metaphysical grounding (which I sometimes refer to simply as “grounding”) is a vividly 
discussed relation of the XXI century analytic metaphysics. It is a non-causal meta-
physical relation holding between facts (or objects13) where a grounded fact holds due 
to a grounding fact. Grounding provides explanation of why a grounded fact holds: it 
holds because of a grounding fact. Therefore, a proposition that “mental facts hold in 
virtue of neuro-physical facts” means that neuro-physical facts ground mental facts, and 
the former explain the existence of the latter. In a grounding relation, the facts that are 
among the grounds are called “grounding facts”, whereas the facts that they ground are 
called “grounded facts”.
Jonathan Schaffer succinctly describes grounding via its similarity to causation. He 
writes that “Grounding is something like metaphysical causation. Just as causation links 
the world across time, grounding links the world across levels”14.
Such a characteristic assumes a multi-layer structure of the universe. There are many 
levels of reality, and facts on a higher level are grounded in facts existing on a lower one. For 
10 I use the term “moral fact” without associating it with moral realism. Moral facts are simply facts about the content 
of morality independent of one’s metaethical position. Therefore, one can operate by the term “moral fact” even if 
she is a proponent of inclusive legal positivism who opposes moral realism.
11 G. Rosen, What is a Moral Law?, in: R. Shaffer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 12, Oxford 2017, p. 135.
12 S. Finlay, Recent Work on Normativity, “Analysis” 2010/2, p. 332.
13 J. Schaffer, Monism: The Priority of the Whole, “Philosophical Review” 2010/1, pp. 31–76.
14 J. Schaffer, Grounding, Transitivity and Contrasitivity, in: F. Correia, B. Schnieder (eds.), Grounding: Understanding 
the Structure of Reality, Cambridge 2012, p. 122.
8 Szymon Mazurkiewicz
instance, if it is the case that mental facts are grounded in neuro-physical facts, the former 
exist on a higher level of reality than the latter and are irreducible to them. From a logi-
cal point of view, the relation of metaphysical grounding is irreflexive (A never grounds 
itself), asymmetric (if A grounds B, B never grounds A), and transitive (if A grounds B 
and B grounds C, it means that A grounds C)15. These logical properties involve strong 
metaphysical consequences: in a grounding relation, the grounding fact is ontologically 
prior to the grounded fact. Moreover, if a fact is grounded in another fact, there is no 
grounding relation in the opposite direction and, consequently, explanation goes only in 
one way. Transitivity is able to provide a chain of grounding relations and explanations 
referring to deeper levels of the universe. If it is the case that biological facts are grounded 
in chemical facts and chemical facts are grounded in physical facts, it entails that physical 
facts ground biological facts. Thus, biological facts hold in virtue of physical facts.
Grounding provides metaphysical explanation: if A holds in virtue of B, it means 
that B explains why A holds. If one wonders about the foundations of A, one can refer 
to the fact that B is grounded in A in order to explain the holding of A. Logical proper-
ties of grounding – irreflexitivity, asymmetricality, and transitivity – are properties that 
explanation has as well.
Grounding involves necessity. As Fabrice Correia puts it, “Necessarily, if the fact that 
A is grounded in some given facts, then it is impossible that the latter facts all exist but 
fail to ground the fact that A”16. In other words, when a particular grounding relation 
holds and the grounding fact holds, it is necessary that the grounded fact hold as well. 
Grounding does not mean that it is necessary that the grounding fact obtain, nor that it is 
necessary that the grounded fact obtain independently of the grounding relation and the 
grounding fact. For instance, if it is true that mental facts are grounded in neuro-physical 
facts and neuro-physical facts obtain, it is necessary that mental facts obtain as well.
Two distinctions made by Kit Fine are important. The first is the distinction between 
full and partial grounding. While A and B both fully ground C, A partly grounds C and 
B partly grounds C. Obviously, a fact may have many grounding facts. The second is 
a distinction on mediate and immediate grounding. Immediate grounding is a ground-
ing relation that is not mediated by other grounding relation. Fine describes it as follows:
The statement that A  (B  C) is mediately grounded in the statements that A, B, C, since 
the grounding must be seen to be mediated through B, C grounding (B  C) and A, (B  C) 
grounding A  (B  C). The statements B, C, by contrast, immediately ground B  C, since 
the grounding in this case is not mediated through other relationships of ground17.
However, a fundamental question remains unanswered: what is the nature of meta-
physical grounding? What is the justification or explanation of the fact that grounding 
holds? Is there not something unintelligible when one claims that mental facts are 
grounded in neuro-physical facts without any further illumination of this metaphysical 
relation?
In the theory of metaphysical grounding there are three answers to that question: 
1) metaphysical grounding is primitive and it cannot be further analysed; 2) meta-
physical grounding holds due to the relation between the essences of grounding and 
grounded facts; and 3) metaphysical grounding holds on the basis of metaphysical laws.
15 I use A as “the fact that A”; the same goes for B and C.
16 F. Correia, Existential Dependence and Cognate Notions, Munich 2005, p. 61.
17 K. Fine, Guide to Ground, in: F. Correia, B. Schnieder (eds.), Grounding…, p. 50.
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3.1. Grounding is primitive
The first option claiming that grounding is primitive seems to be the very first answer 
given by the proponents of grounding18. In his seminal paper, which opened the discus-
sion on metaphysical grounding, Fine claims the following:
[T]here is a primitive metaphysical concept of reality, one that cannot be understood in fun-
damentally different terms; and second, that questions of what is real are to be settled upon 
the basis of considerations of ground19.
For Fine, metaphysical grounding enables us to understand what is real. And while 
reality is primitive, the same goes for grounding, which expresses relations between real 
facts. This can also be seen in Fine’s definition of metaphysical grounding:
I recommend that a statement of ground be cast in the following “canonical” form: 
Its being the case that S consists in nothing more than its being the case that T, U, ...20.
If a grounded fact consists in nothing more than the grounded fact, it means that if 
it is the case that A grounds B, B holds simply due to A that grounds it. There is nothing 
more to be said.
Ricki Bliss and Kelly Trogdon claim that the primitive nature of grounding prevails 
among its proponents:
The more or less received view among proponents of grounding, however, is that the concept 
isn’t analysable – the concept of grounding is ultimately primitive in nature […], it’s important 
to keep in mind that this doesn’t mean that talk of grounding is obscure, or that grounding 
claims are confused or unjustified. It seems that many notions central to philosophy are uni-
tary and unanalyzable (consider synchronic identity, for example), yet this leads few to dismiss 
them as obscure, confused, or unjustified21.
For those who regard grounding as primitive there is nothing undermining its clear 
and well-founded basis. There are many philosophical concepts that are highly unlikely 
to be defined in terms of other concepts, and no one denies their intelligibility.
There is one important argument for the primitive nature of metaphysical groun-
ding. There is a strong, quite widely shared intuition that higher-level facts, like mental 
facts or normative facts, hold due to some lower-level facts, natural facts, like biological 
or physical facts. Similarly, higher-level natural facts (probably) hold due to lower-level 
natural facts, e.g. biological facts hold in virtue of chemical facts (although the current 
state of science cannot prove it). This chain stops somewhere, perhaps on a quantum 
level or yet-unknown but postulated level below the quantum level, like the string level. 
And our explanation of those dependencies needs to stop somewhere as well. For that 
reason, metaphysical grounding, being a metaphysical relation explaining the holding 
of one fact in virtue of another, is postulated to be such a primitive and ultimate meta-
physical explanatory relation in order to avoid regress ad infinitum in our explanation.
18 K. Fine, Guide…; J. Schaffer, On What Grounds What, in: D. Manley, D. Chalmers, R. Wasserman (eds.), New Essays 
on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford 2009, pp. 347–383; G. Rosen, Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Re-
duction, in: B. Hale, A. Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology, Oxford 2010, pp. 109–135.
19 K. Fine, The Question of Realism, “Philosophers’ Imprint” 2001/1, p. 1.
20 K. Fine, The Question…, p. 15.
21 R. Bliss, K. Trogdon, Metaphysical Grounding, in: E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2016, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grounding, accessed on: 20.06.2019.
10 Szymon Mazurkiewicz
3.2. Grounding holds due to essences
The view that grounding holds due to relations between essences of facts is proposed 
by Fine in his later writings, as well as by Gideon Rosen and Shamik Dasgupta22. For 
Fine, the essence of an object or property is the propositions that define it23. He argues 
that the essence of an object is not identical with its necessary properties – a property 
may be necessary for an object, yet still it does not have to make this object into that 
which it actually is24. For example, it is a necessary property of Socrates that he is the 
sole member of a unit set {Socrates}, but it is counterintuitive to say that this is an es-
sential property of Socrates25. It is not being the sole member of a set {Socrates} that 
makes Socrates Socrates.
Once we know what the essence of a given thing is, we can understand what the 
claim that grounding holds due to essences means. Rosen gives the following example: 
“Every triangle has three angles. Why? Because it lies in the nature of a triangle to have 
three angles. Part of what it is to be a triangle is to have three angles”26. For Rosen, 
the concept of nature is identical to the concept of essence. It is important that, for 
Fine and Rosen, essences explain general grounding facts – they explain why groun-
ding holds as a general relation. For them, metaphysical grounding holds because the 
essence of a grounding fact (like having three angles being the essence of a triangle) 
makes a grounding fact occur (like x being a triangle). Since such is the universal form 
of metaphysical grounding, every particular grounding relation also has such a form. 
Essentialist views on grounding seem to provide intelligibility that the primitive notion 
of grounding is lacking.
3.3. Grounding holds due to metaphysical laws
The third option is that metaphysical grounding holds due to metaphysical laws. It is 
proposed in Schaffer’s and Rosen’s recent works27. An analysis without strong adhe-
rence to this position of explanation of grounding may be found in Stephanie Leary28. 
Schaffer claims: “Just like causal explanation requires laws of nature, so metaphysical 
explanation requires laws of metaphysics”29. While grounding is in general a form of 
metaphysical explanation, in every case there is a particular metaphysical law that ma-
kes such an explanation appropriate. This version is strongly influenced by a form of 
explanation in natural sciences. Boris Kment notices:
[T]here is a far-reaching structural analogy between causation and grounding. Just as earlier 
states of the universe typically give rise to later ones by causing them, metaphysically more 
fundamental facts give rise to less fundamental ones by grounding them. Certain general 
22 K. Fine, Guide…; G. Rosen, Metaphysical…; S. Dasgupta, On the Plurality of Grounds, “Philosophers’ Imprint” 
2014/14, pp. 1–28.
23 K. Fine, Senses of Essence, in: W. Sinnott-Armstrong, D. Raffman, N. Asher (eds.), Modality, Morality and Belief. 
Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus, Cambridge 1995, p. 53–73.
24 K. Fine, Essences and Modality, “Philosophical Perspectives” 1994/8, pp. 1–16.
25 K. Fine, Essences…, p. 8.
26 G. Rosen, Metaphysical…, p. 119.
27 J. Schaffer, Laws for Metaphysical Explanation, “Philosophical Issues” 2017/27, pp. 302–321; G. Rosen, What is…
28 S. Leary, Non-naturalism and Normative Necessities, in: R. Shaffer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 12, 
Oxford 2017, pp. 76–105.
29 J. Schaffer, Laws…, p. 315.
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metaphysical principles, which I will call “laws of metaphysics”, play essentially the same role 
in grounding as natural laws do in causation30.
Schaffer claims that metaphysical laws, which underlie metaphysical explanation, are 
fundamental: there is no deeper level by which explanation of metaphysical laws would 
be possible31. More technically, Schaffer claims that functions defined in set-theory 
terms can represent metaphysical laws32. He also claims that even if someone accepts 
the essentialist version of grounding, a connection between essences of grounding and 
grounded facts is still required, and this connection is a metaphysical law33. Therefore, 
for him, the essentialist conception of grounding must presuppose metaphysical laws, 
and an essentialist approach can be reduced to a metaphysical laws approach.
Consider the ways of explanation in natural sciences. Scientists discover laws of 
nature and by reference to them explain why one thing causes another thing. Why did 
a billiard ball make another billiard ball move? Because of Newton’s second law of mo-
tion. Why did a rise in the temperature of gas caused a rise in its tension? Because of 
the ideal gas law. The fact that a ball moved was caused by its being hit by another ball, 
as there is Newton’s second law of motion. The rise of gas pressure was caused by a rise 
of gas temperature due to the ideal gas law. Causal relations between two events are 
fully explained by a particular law of nature.
Some metaphysicians would like to have a very similar form of explanation in the 
metaphysical sphere. And just as causality constitutes explanation in natural sciences 
and is formed by natural laws, metaphysical grounding constitutes metaphysical expla-
nation, which holds due to metaphysical laws. Just like causality is backed by laws of 
nature, grounding is backed by metaphysical laws.
One clear example of grounding holding due to metaphysical laws may be given in 
the normative domain. Assume that utilitarianism is true, at least for the purpose of this 
example. What makes to exist a normative fact that something is good in utilitarianism? That 
a certain underlying natural fact fulfils the requirement of the utilitarian principle: it gives the 
greatest amount of happiness to the greatest number of people. This way, a moral, normative 
fact has been explained with reference to a natural fact. Metaphysically, this normative fact 
is grounded in a particular natural fact. And this particular grounding relation holds because 
of the utilitarian principle. Therefore, under the notion of grounding holding due to meta-
physical laws, utilitarian principle constitutes a metaphysical law in this particular grounding 
relation as it backs the grounding relation between normative facts and natural facts.
The reference to the metaphysical law provides the explanation of the grounding 
relation just like the reference to Newton’s second law of motion provides explanation 
for one billiard ball’s movement after being hit by another billiard ball.
4. Grounding in positivist theory of law
Gizbert-Studnicki states that the SST should be understood in terms of grounding34. 
The SST claim that legal facts are ultimately determined by social facts alone should be 
30 B. Kment, Modality and Explanatory Reasoning, Oxford 2014, p. 5.
31 J. Schaffer, Laws…, p. 315.
32 J. Schaffer, Laws…, p. 313.
33 J. Schaffer, Laws…, p. 316.
34 T. Gizbert-Studnicki, Metafizyka…; T. Gizbert-Studnicki, The Social…; I refer henceforth to the second work as it 
is written in English and thus easier to be read by a non-Polish speaker.
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understood as the claim that legal facts are metaphysically grounded in social facts. As 
the SST is not a logical, semantic or epistemic thesis, but a metaphysical one, applying 
a universal explanatory metaphysical relation – metaphysical grounding – seems plau-
sible. As the SST is meant to exclude any other basis of law than social facts, especially 
moral facts, such a claim implies that legal facts are fully metaphysically grounded in 
social facts. It means that there are no other facts among their grounds.
Let us recall the way in which grounding is necessary. It means that if a certain kind 
of social facts occur and it is true that social facts ground legal facts, certain legal facts 
necessarily occur as well. If certain kind of social facts as facts about regularities in 
a society and some mental attitude towards those regularities do not occur, legal facts 
do not occur either. Grounding being necessary fits in perfectly with positivistic views 
on the origins of law.
The grounding account of determination of legal facts by social facts is also con-
sistent with inclusive legal positivism. As the SST is able to grasp the way in which 
inclusivists see the foundations of legal facts, so must it do with grounding applications. 
For an inclusivist, it may happen that the rule of recognition refers to moral facts in 
determining whether a certain fact is a legal fact. In terms of grounding, it may happen 
that legal facts are grounded in moral facts, whose legal relevance is in turn grounded 
in social facts. Mediate grounding is the best formulation of this phenomena: grounding 
of legal facts in social facts is mediated by moral facts. Still, the ultimate ground of legal 
facts consists only of social facts. One can also make a reference to the transitivity of 
metaphysical grounding. As grounding is transitive, eventually, legal facts are grounded 
in social facts.
There is, however, one problem in the thesis that legal facts are grounded in so-
cial facts, which Gizbert-Studnicki is aware of35. As legal facts are normative facts and 
social facts are descriptive facts, how can a normative fact be fully grounded in a descrip-
tive fact?36 Pekka Vayrynen claims that for a non-normative fact to be able to ground 
a normative fact, the former must be normatively relevant. But being normatively 
relevant is to be actually a normative fact37. We fall into infinite regress. One of the 
options discussed by Gizbert-Studnicki is to claim that there is a peculiar normative 
grounding relation that enables such a grounding of normative facts in descriptive facts. 
However, Gizbert-Studnicki finds it explanatory weak and mysterious. Greenberg’s 
objection to legal positivism seems to be motivated by this problem: social facts cannot 
ground legal facts as the rational-relation requirement, which would make this rela-
tion intelligible, is not satisfied38. Plunkett believes that legal facts can be grounded in 
social facts with reference to conceptual facts39, but I do not see such a proposition as 
promising. Firstly, conceptual facts seem not to be social facts – to claim that legal facts 
are grounded also in other kinds of facts may mean that one abandons legal positivism. 
Secondly, conceptual facts are rather queer metaphysical entities. Therefore, although 
Plunkett was the first to notice that philosophers of law operate by a concept very similar 
to the general analytic relation of metaphysical grounding and that the debate between 
35 T. Gizbert-Studnicki, The Social…, p. 138.
36 This applies only to legal facts being normative facts in the strong sense. If one regards legal facts as normative only 
in the weak sense, the problem of grounding them in descriptive facts would disappear.
37 P. Vayrynen, Grounding and Normative Explanation,  “Proceedings of Aristotelian Society” 2013/1, pp. 155–178.
38 M. Greenberg, How Facts… 
39 D. Plunkett, A Positivist… 
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legal positivism and non-positivism actually refers to the facts that ground legal facts, 
I believe there is a much more promising resolution to this problem.
This account of grounding as determining the relation between social and legal 
facts is based on a primitive view of grounding. Gizbert-Studnicki explicitly claims that 
grounding is a primitive concept, but in his opinion, it does not undermine its intelligibil-
ity40. Under such account, the grounding version of the SST is that legal facts are fully 
grounded in social facts, and since grounding is primitive, such a relation simply holds, 
and nothing more can be said. If someone has any doubts about the intelligibility of the 
above thesis, there is nothing to be said in order to convince her beyond telling the story 
of legal facts, social facts, and the primitive, ultimate explanatory relation of metaphysi-
cal grounding once more. Consider the analogy with billiard balls. If one wonders why 
a billiard ball moved, I can respond that it moved because another billiard ball hit it. But 
she can reasonably ask: “OK, but why is it that one ball hitting another makes it move?”. 
If my response is: “It just happens; there is a primitive relation of causality. I’m sorry 
but that’s the most I can tell you”, it would be considered a rather poor explanation. 
I believe the same goes for the intelligibility of the claim that legal facts are grounded 
in social facts with the application of the primitive concept of grounding.
My claim is that the conception of grounding as a relation based on metaphysical 
laws is much more plausible and avoids the objection of unintelligibility. In the next part 
of the paper, I will examine this conception and propose such a particular metaphysical 
law backing grounding relations between legal facts and social facts.
Before I do that, I would like to present some remarks about not applying essential-
ist conceptions of grounding. Firstly, it is highly contested whether there is anything 
like a nature or essence of law41. This is clearly noticeable when one adopts Fine’s view 
on essence42, that in order to find the essence of legal facts one should not only find 
necessary features of legal facts, but also find among them those that make legal facts 
into what they are43. Moreover, Schaffer claims that even if one finds the essence of 
grounding and grounded facts, she still must look for a metaphysical law that makes 
this connection occur44.
For these reasons, although I do not reject completely the possibility of adopting an 
essentialist conception of grounding to the analysed issue, I prefer to choose another 
conception of grounding, namely that grounding is based on metaphysical laws, which 
I found to be much more cogent in application to the issue of grounding relation be-
tween social and legal facts.
5. Grounding between legal facts and social facts based on a metaphysical law
My thesis is therefore that the best account of the SST is that legal facts are fully gro-
unded in social facts and that this particular grounding holds due to a metaphysical law. 
I consider grounding based on metaphysical laws as best for providing intelligibility 
40 T. Gizbert-Studnicki, The Social…, p. 136.
41 T. Gizbert-Studnicki, A. Dyrda, A. Grabowski, Metodologiczne Dychotomie: krytyka pozytywistycznych teorii prawa 
[Eng. Methodological dichotomies: a critique of positivist legal theories], Warszawa 2016, pp. 66–71.
42 K. Fine, Essence…
43 A. Marmor, Farewell to Conceptual Analysis (in Jurisprudence), in: W. Waluchow, S. Sciaraffa (eds.), Philosophical 
Foundations of the Nature of Law, Oxford 2013, pp. 209–229.
44 J. Schaffer, Laws…, pp. 316–317.
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to grounding relations. The core issue is, however, what exactly this metaphysical law 
is in this context.
To begin with, some conditions of searching for such a  law must be presented. 
It must be fundamental. Schaffer describes fundamentality in the following way: 
“By «fundamental» I mean that there are ungrounded facts about the existence of 
these entities”45. Metaphysical law cannot be justified or explained by reference to other 
entities. Secondly, in our case of the SST, as legal facts are normative facts and social 
facts are descriptive facts, it must be a law that connects the descriptive and normative 
spheres. Thirdly, as legal positivism is a general theory of law, it must be able to explain 
the existence of legal facts in any actual or possible legal system. It must be universal.
My candidate for the metaphysical law is a norm of instrumental rationality: “in 
order to achieve an end, adopt suitable means”. Consider Shapiro’s planning theory of 
law46. He claims that law is a planning activity and he proposes plans and master plans, 
which are social facts, as a framework explaining legal facts. He is aware of the general 
problem of normativity of legal facts in legal positivism as he states the following: “On 
the one hand, legal authority must be conferred by legal norms; yet, on the other, legal 
norms must be created by legal authority. From these two assumptions, we get a classic 
chicken-egg paradox”47. In order to be able to create legal plans, there must be legal 
authority. But legal authority holds due to legal norms. And as legal norms are created 
by legal authority, we fall into a vicious circle48. In terms of grounding, legal facts as 
facts about the content of legal norms are grounded in facts about legal authority. But 
facts about legal authority are grounded in legal facts. And the application of groun-
ding illuminates the problem as well: if A is grounded in B, B cannot be grounded in A, 
since grounding is asymmetrical. Shapiro, however, seems to escape from this problem:
Notice that the Planning Theory is able to secure the existence of fundamental legal rules 
without generating vicious circles or infinite regresses. Legal officials have the power to adopt 
the shared plan that sets out these fundamental rules by virtue of the norms of instrumental 
rationality. Since these norms that confer the rational power to plan are not themselves 
plans, they have not been created by any other authority. They exist simply in virtue of being 
rationally valid principles49.
Firstly, let me consider the metaphysical place of instrumental rationality in legal 
positivism. As norms of instrumental rationality do not depend in their existence on other 
entities, vicious circles or infinite regresses do not arise. But consider: the planning acti-
vity of legal officials, which is a social fact that makes legal facts emerge, holds by virtue 
of the norms of instrumental rationality. It seems that the basis of legal facts is constituted 
both by social facts and norms of instrumental rationality. And instrumental rationality is 
obviously not a social fact. Does it not stand contrary to the SST’s claim that legal facts 
are grounded only in social facts? Vicious circles or infinite regress are avoided, but it is 
unlikely to be a positivistic theory at all. If instrumental rationality is necessary for legal 
positivism, it may be argued that the SST is false, but abandoning the SST’s results in the 
rejection of legal positivism. Gizbert-Studnicki, however, opposes such a claim:
45 J. Schaffer, Laws…, p. 315.
46 S. Shapiro, Legality…
47 S. Shapiro, Legality…, p. 179.
48 T. Gizbert-Studnicki, The Social…, p. 139.
49 S. Shapiro, Legality…, p. 181.
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I believe, however, this does not force us to abandon the SST. If we look for the facts that 
ultimately metaphysically determine the law, we find only social facts. Such social facts deter-
mine law on the assumption that the norms of practical rationality are valid. The validity of 
such norms is not a normative fact that contributes to the existence of law but rather a context 
which must exist, if talking about law is to make sense50.
Under such a view, practical rationality (Gizbert-Studnicki’s name for instrumen-
tal rationality) does not stand along with social facts among facts that ground legal 
facts, but is rather a broader context or framework making the whole positivistic 
legal theory possible. I believe that such a thesis reflects the claim that a particular 
grounding relation holds due to a metaphysical law that backs it. Gizbert-Studnicki 
could not express it directly in this framework as he is a proponent of a primitive version 
of grounding, but I think that his analysis of Shapiro’s legal positivism is implicitly quite 
close to the thesis that instrumental rationality constitutes a metaphysical law, which 
makes positivist grounding claims hold. Moreover, Shapiro himself seems to implicitly 
regard instrumental rationality as some kind of deeper surface backing the relation of 
determination between social facts and legal facts. The relation of determination is 
considered to actually be metaphysical grounding. In my view, instrumental rationality 
in legal positivism has a form of a metaphysical law that backs this grounding relation.
Let us examine the condition that must be set for a metaphysical law to be able 
to back grounding between legal and social facts. Instrumental rationality is funda-
mental – it does not hold due to anything else and is not grounded in any other facts51. 
It simply holds just like other basic metaphysical laws hold, e.g. the Aristotelian law of 
excluded middle. Instrumental rationality connects descriptive and normative spheres: 
if my aim is Y, I should do X. Y is a descriptive fact; “ought to do” X is a normative fact. 
It is also universal: it does not exist only in certain cultures or only under the adoption 
of some other metaphysical propositions.
Instrumental rationality backs the grounding relation between social facts and legal 
facts and provides legal relevance of social facts. Taking Shapiro’s theory, instrumental 
rationality gives legal officials the ability to create plans. Their attitudes, beliefs, etc. 
give birth to law. This is possible as norms of instrumental rationality, which are able 
to explain how an aim of Y can be obtained by X, stand behind. Y is a social fact of 
attitudes, beliefs, etc., X is a legal fact. In other words, instrumental rationality enables 
social facts to be the foundation for legal facts. Without instrumental rationality social 
facts could not generate legal facts. This is why instrumental rationality is a metaphysi-
cal law underpinning grounding relation between social and legal facts.
50 T. Gizbert-Studnicki, The Social…, p. 140.
51 One may prefer to regard instrumental rationality as a conceptual truth. I believe there is no contradiction between 
seeing it as a conceptual truth and as a metaphysical law. Conceptual truth is a proposition that is true solely on the 
basis of concepts; linguistic competence is enough to know it, with no relevance of empirical facts. On the other hand, 
metaphysical law, which is fundamental, is an ultimate form of metaphysical explanation of why certain facts hold. 
Fundamentality means that metaphysical law does not hold due to other entities. This aspect of being fundamental 
is quite close to conceptual truths’ being true solely on the basis of concepts and not empirical facts. Therefore, it 
seems that, at least in some cases, there can be a connection between metaphysical laws and conceptual truths, for 
instance that a metaphysical law expresses a conceptual truth. If instrumental rationality is a conceptual truth, meta-
physical law of instrumental rationality expresses this conceptual truth. On the other hand, one should not forget that 
metaphysical laws has explanatory role of why some facts hold, which is not shared by the conception of conceptual 
truths. In fact, the concept of conceptual truth belongs to epistemology and in some extent to philosophy of language, 
whereas the idea of metaphysical laws belongs to metaphysics, so the relation between them is not straightforward 
and by far needs much more detailed analysis than this short sketch. 
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Even if Shapiro’s version of legal positivism implicitly has the form of the claim that 
instrumental rationality is a metaphysical law backing a grounding relation between so-
cial facts and legal facts, I believe it is true for every version of legal positivism. Let me 
consider this on the example of the Hartian rule of recognition, one which every legal 
positivist accepts. I believe that instrumental rationality can explain why the Hartian 
rule of recognition is metaphysically and legally relevant. Under Hart’s version of posi-
tivism, instrumental rationality can be seen as providing legal relevance to the rule of 
recognition (legal officials recognize some rules as legal rules). And it can be explained 
with reference to norms of instrumental rationality: they want to attain an aim by use of 
some means. This aim may be, as a general aim of law under legal positivism, a binding 
solution to some social or moral problems without sliding into moral discourse. And as 
this aim is achieved, some rules are recognized as legal rules. In such a way, social facts 
ground a legal fact with instrumental rationality underpinning.
Hence, legal facts are fully grounded in social facts due to instrumental rationality 
that backs this grounding relation. It follows from Shapiro’s thought; he was not able 
to explicitly express it since the metaphysical debate on grounding was on its starting 
point at the time when his work was published and the discussion on the basis of meta-
physical grounding, including metaphysical laws, had not begun yet. In some sense, 
Shapiro foresaw the metaphysical method by which legal facts can be explained, but did 
not possess direct conceptual tools to be able to explicitly formulate it in a metaphysical 
way. As I have presented it, the thesis that social facts ground legal facts with backing 
instrumental rationality can be extended to the whole of legal positivism.
One may object to the view that instrumental rationality is a metaphysical law on two 
possible bases: firstly, there are no metaphysical laws; secondly there are metaphysical 
laws, but instrumental rationality is not one of them. I believe those possible objections 
are not sound. Acceptance of the existence of metaphysical laws is one’s metaphysi-
cal belief and ontological commitment. We differ in metaphysical beliefs, but we can 
reasonably argue for the existence of such entities like moral facts, non-reductive con-
sciences, and metaphysical relations (grounding being one of them), while some oppose 
them and prefer more austere metaphysics. Metaphysical claims are notoriously contro-
versial, but some metaphysical framework has to be accepted. One of the many possible 
arguments for the existence of metaphysical laws is that they are necessary to provide 
metaphysical explanations in the metaphysical domain in much the same way as natural 
laws provide scientific explanations in the natural domain. I opt for more metaphysical 
entities enabling explanation in the metaphysical sphere over austere metaphysics that 
has fewer ontological commitments, being at the same time incapable of explaining 
many phenomena.
As for the second basis of objection against instrumental rationality, an opponent 
might argue that talking about instrumental rationality as a metaphysical law assumes 
a rational structure of the universe, similar to Stoics’ conception of Logos that included 
both physical and moral laws. For some such a rational structure of the universe may 
be unacceptable. I find it unsound. Compare this with theoretical views on the nature 
of logics and mathematics; some argue for constructivism, wherein we construct logi-
cal and mathematical principles, some for Platonism, wherein we discover objectively 
existing principles of logics and mathematics. Logical and mathematical principles are 
not natural laws, but for a Platonist they constitute what contemporary analytic meta-
physics would label as metaphysical laws. Instrumental rationality is not so far from 
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logical principles, like the law of excluded middle. It is a law of thought and conduct, 
and if one wants to be rational, she should apply it, just like one who wants to reach 
correct conclusions should apply logical principles. If one has no problem with accep-
ting universal mathematical truths that can be labelled as metaphysical laws, one should 
not have problems with accepting instrumental rationality that also can be qualified as 
metaphysical law.
A careful reader may notice a possible contradiction. Earlier in this paper, in section 
2, I claim that legal facts are normative in the strong sense, which means that they have 
reason-giving force and hold independently of our beliefs. On the other hand, I argue 
that the relation of metaphysical grounding holding between social and legal facts is 
backed by the metaphysical law of instrumental rationality. But instrumental rationality 
has rather a weak normative force, since it operates by hypothetical imperative and not 
by categorical one. In turn, legal facts bind independently of one’s aims and desires that 
could form the first part of hypothetical imperative. It may seem therefore that instru-
mental rationality, though weaker in normative force, is claimed to be the foundation of 
legal facts possessing stronger normative force, which may give rise to many doubts. But 
this is based on a misconception. The normativity of a particular legal fact, like the fact 
that tax evasion is prohibited in Poland, cannot be understood to be identical with the 
normativity of legal facts treated as a whole. These legal facts as a whole can be labelled 
simply as law in the most general meaning of this term in the legal context. The aim 
of this paper is to answer the most fundamental question of why legal facts as a whole 
exist (or in other words, simply: why law exists). And I believe that the normativity of 
law as a whole is different from the normativity of particular legal facts. For instance, 
Shapiro, when analysing normativity of law under his planning theory of law, attributes 
the existence of normative entities like legal authority, rights and obligations to “highly 
impersonal shared practices of social planning” that hold on the level of master plan, 
which regulates the planning activity of planners (officials)52. When we bear in mind 
that for Shapiro planning activity is possible in virtue of the norms of instrumental 
rationality, it turns out that the source of the normativity of law as a whole lies partly 
(the other part being the shared social practice of planning) in instrumental rationa-
lity, and not in any stronger normative entity that could be formulated by categorical 
imperative53. I share similar views: I believe that that normativity of law as a whole 
viewed most generally from the metaphysical point of view holds due to our collective 
aims, plans etc. that can be realized due to instrumental rationality. On the other hand, 
the normativity of particular legal facts (like that fact that tax evasion is prohibited in 
Poland) is of a different kind: it holds because a particular legal fact belongs to a legal 
system and a person’s conduct can be assessed by using this legal fact independently of 
one’s beliefs; therefore a legal fact has a reason-giving force and is normative in strong 
sense54. The normativity of legal facts as a whole is different from the normativity of 
particular legal facts.
52 S. Shapiro, Legality…, p. 182.
53 It seems that non-positivism would operate by categorical imperative in formulating foundations of law since moral 
facts are formulated by categorical and not hypothetical imperative. 
54 It should be noticed that for Shapiro legal obligations are not genuine obligations as only moral obligations are 
genuine obligations, what may be quite curious considering that he is an exclusive positivist. For him, as well as for 
Joseph Raz, legal obligations have only a necessary claim to authority, which in many cases is not met. For Shapiro, 
particular legal facts do not possess strong normative force. On the other hand, I believe they do have strong nor-
mative force.
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Therefore, the SST should be understood as the thesis that legal facts are fully 
grounded in social facts due to the instrumental rationality that backs this grounding 
relation. It means that social facts are metaphysically prior to legal facts and make them 
exist. Social facts are able to explain the existence of legal facts because grounding 
has explanatory force. And this particular grounding relation holds due to instrumen-
tal rationality, which is a metaphysical law that backs this grounding relation. Thanks 
to that, we avoid the unintelligibility of primitive versions of grounding. If one wonders 
why social facts actually ground legal facts, the answer is because of the instrumental 
rationality that backs it. Under primitive notions of grounding, the only possible an-
swer would be “because it simply grounds; grounding is a primitive notion and nothing 
more can be said”. Recalling the problem of explaining the movement of billiard balls, 
reference to instrumental rationality in the grounding of legal facts in social facts is like 
adding “because there is Newton’s second law of motion” in response to questions why 
one ball caused another ball’s movement.
Moreover, instrumental rationality that backs grounding relations between legal facts 
and social facts helps explain the normative nature of legal facts without regress: legal 
facts are normative facts due to fundamental metaphysical laws of instrumental rationa-
lity that back their being grounded in descriptive social facts. As instrumental rationality 
does not stand along with social facts among the grounds of legal facts, it is consistent 
with positivist theory. And as instrumental rationality is fundamental, the regress of 
explaining normative facts with reference to other normative facts is avoided. This is 
another advantage of grounding based on metaphysical laws over primitive notions of 
grounding in grounding interpretations of the SST.
6. Conclusions
Taking advantage of metaphysical grounding holding due to metaphysical laws lacks 
the drawbacks of primitive notions: unintelligibility and problems with explaining the 
normative nature of legal facts.
Applying such a version of grounding to a positivist theory of law can provide a wider 
framework for discussions among legal philosophers. Legal theory can be developed 
with a strong connection to general analytic metaphysics, which has been developing 
rapidly for about two decades. Analytic metaphysics can provide many useful tools for 
legal philosophers and make explanations in theory of law consistent with the general 
manner of explanation. Using a grounding version that refers to metaphysical laws is 
a good example since the explanation of legal facts is developed in the same way as the 
explanation of any kind of metaphysical facts in philosophical investigations. Moreover, 
it is developed in a very similar way to explanations in the natural sciences, which is con-
sidered to be the ideal type of scientific explanation. Causality, which has an explanatory 
role in the natural sciences, strongly corresponds to metaphysical grounding, which is 
the metaphysical way of explanation; the counterparts of laws of nature in metaphysics 
are metaphysical laws.
Application of the notion of metaphysical grounding to the SST can also have other 
interesting consequences. Since grounding is a transitive relation and social facts do not 
seem to be fundamental facts (but are likely to be grounded in other kind of facts) those 
other kind of facts that would ground social facts would also ground legal facts due 
to the transitive nature of grounding. But this is a question for another paper.
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Legal Positivism Social Source Thesis and Metaphysical Grounding: 
Employing Metaphysical Grounding based on Metaphysical Laws
Abstract: The core of legal positivism is the so-called social source thesis, which claims that 
legal facts are determined only by social facts. I examine an interpretation of this thesis 
that uses metaphysical grounding as an exact relation between legal facts and social facts. 
I argue that the current interpretation of the social source thesis in terms of metaphysical 
grounding has significant drawbacks that stem from it being based on the view that 
metaphysical grounding is a primitive relation. For that reason, the current interpretation 
is unintelligible and poses problems with explaining the normativity of legal facts. I present 
two other views on metaphysical grounding: that it holds due to essences of facts and that it 
holds due to metaphysical laws. I apply the notion that metaphysical grounding holds due 
to metaphysical laws and argue that in the case of grounding of legal facts in social facts, this 
metaphysical law is constituted by instrumental rationality. It provides intelligibility to 
this grounding relation, is able to explain the normative character of legal facts, and is 
compatible with the general form of explanation.
Keywords: social source thesis, legal facts, metaphysical grounding, metaphysical laws, 
instrumental rationality
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